Before Donald Trump had even taken a single executive decision following his return to the White House, countries around the world were already positioning themselves in anticipation of his impact. Princeton University politics professor John Ikenberry offered a stark assessment: “A revisionist state has arrived on the scene to contest the liberal international order, and it is not Russia or China, it is the United States. It is Trump in the Oval Office, the beating heart of the free world. The incoming administration contests every element of the liberal international order – trade, alliances, migration, multilateralism, democratic solidarity and human rights. The narrative now at home and abroad is that the US is not what we thought it was. Trump was not an aberration, not a bug, but a feature of American politics and of America’s story.” Ikenberry’s assessment led him to a crucial question: “Will the new global order be determined less by the US and more by its legacy partners? Will they seek an alternative framework globally and regionally, or will they make bets to ride this out, and do the transactional politics that Trump is going to request?”

From Ankara to Brussels, Tehran to Moscow, the world was in motion, seeking answers to variations of this question. Countries were positioning, responding, and adjusting to the long shadow cast by Trump’s return, even before he’d made a single decision. Trump himself seemed somewhat unnerved by the global reaction, admitting in Paris, “The world seems to be going a little crazy now.” Amid this uncertainty, three distinct responses to the Trump administration began to emerge.

One group, ideologically aligned with Trump, felt emboldened. This included populists in Europe, Latin America, and Israel who believed their often Russia-friendly nationalism would benefit from an “America First” approach. The potential consequences ranged from the breakup of the European Union to Argentina-style deregulation, a new security architecture with Russia, and even regime change in Tehran.

A second group, led by China, anticipated a diplomatic shake-up with America as an agent of instability, potentially leading to a global realignment. For Beijing, facing the threat of 50% tariffs, Trump’s willingness to treat allies as foes presented an opportunity to exploit a leadership vacuum, positioning China as the advocate of “the global majority.” This represented one version of the “alternative framework” Ikenberry mentioned. Aware of this risk, Trump threatened to impose 100% tariffs on BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, along with Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia, and the United Arab Emirates) if they attempted to replace the US dollar.

The third group, a more phlegmatic collection of America’s “legacy partners” in Europe and the G7, hoped to persuade Trump through argument, flattery, and self-abnegation that his self-interest aligned with continued cooperation. Despite their revulsion at Trump’s methods, these leaders felt compelled to interact with him, as NATO chief Mark Rutte stated in February: “We have to dance with whoever is on the dancefloor.” The strategy focused on influencing Trump’s thinking and demonstrating that American interests extended beyond its borders. However, as a backup plan, these nations were strengthening alternative frameworks, as evidenced by European Council on Foreign Relations polling showing voters across Europe favoring “more Europe” over “more Trump.”

This preference wasn’t surprising, given Trump’s description of the EU as a “not-so-mini-China” and his threat of tariffs, which sparked internal debate within Europe on how to respond. Christine Lagarde, president of the European Central Bank, faced criticism for suggesting Europe should appease Trump by buying US arms and liquefied natural gas, a strategy Pascal Lamy, former WTO director-general, deemed “absolutely wrong,” advocating for strength through market leverage. Even Lamy acknowledged the challenge, citing Europe’s varying levels of dependence on the US and highlighting its lack of geostrategic consistency and unity as weaknesses.

Trump’s true existential threat to Europe lay in Ukraine. Without a detailed peace plan, Trump seemed intent on pressuring both Vladimir Putin and Volodymyr Zelenskyy – threatening rearmament in Ukraine and withdrawal of support, respectively – to force an end to the war. The EU’s outgoing head of foreign service, Josep Borrell, expressed concern about this, highlighting the uncertainty facing Europe should US support for Ukraine cease. Trump himself argued for equalizing financial contributions to the war effort between the US and Europe, citing the distance separating the two as a factor in American commitment.

In response to the risk of a Trump-Putin deal, Zelenskyy proposed a ceasefire based on diplomacy to regain lost territory, in exchange for full NATO membership. This plan, however, was rejected by Rutte.

This left Europe facing crucial decisions with limited time, prompting criticism from Norbert Röttgen, a German CDU foreign affairs specialist, for neglecting to invest more heavily in the US relationship and build up its own defenses. Borrell, while acknowledging efforts to promote European independence, highlighted challenges such as insufficient defense spending, the national veto in foreign policy decisions, and a hollowed-out industrial defense base.

Despite these limitations, a European plan to protect Ukraine was underway, involving a coalition of willing nations cooperating outside EU structures, providing security guarantees through peacekeeping troops. This plan, reportedly involving a substantial number of troops and innovative funding mechanisms, remained largely undisclosed due to its sensitivity.

The situation in the Middle East was equally complex. Trump’s potential actions, ranging from disengagement to major deals, were subject to speculation, even among his closest allies. While some anticipated a hands-off approach, others, like Mike Waltz, anticipated “big transformative deals.” However, Jason Greenblatt, Trump’s previous Middle East envoy, suggested that the Palestinian issue would likely remain secondary, hindering a potential Saudi-Israeli deal due to Saudi Arabia’s condemnation of Israel’s actions in Gaza and the resulting postponement of the Abraham Accords expansion. Like Europe, Gulf states sought to lessen their reliance on the US.

Fawaz Gerges highlighted Saudi Arabia’s diversification of foreign policy, deepening ties with China and Iran, as a response to what he perceived as the Biden administration’s mistreatment of Arab allies. He criticized the US for its support of Israel, arguing that it had failed to integrate Israel into the regional social fabric. Israel, confident in its military strength, planned to continue reshaping the Middle East. The return of Trump raised the possibility of annexation of the West Bank and an attack on Iran’s nuclear sites.

Despite this, Trump might not fully grant Netanyahu’s desires or engage in an ideological war with China, prioritizing trade issues. China, under Xi Jinping, was actively promoting itself as a stable trading partner committed to green energy, contrasting with the uncertainty surrounding Trump’s decision-making style. This contrast resonated internationally. The incoming Vice-President, JD Vance, offered a grim prediction, suggesting widespread fear of repercussions for defying Trump.

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