Before Donald Trump had even taken a single executive decision following his return to the White House, countries around the world were already positioning themselves to respond to his anticipated impact. Princeton University politics professor John Ikenberry offered a stark assessment: “A revisionist state has arrived on the scene to contest the liberal international order, and it is not Russia or China, it is the United States. It is Trump in the Oval Office, the beating heart of the free world. The incoming administration contests every element of the liberal international order – trade, alliances, migration, multilateralism, democratic solidarity and human rights. The narrative now at home and abroad is that the US is not what we thought it was. Trump was not an aberration, not a bug, but a feature of American politics and of America’s story.” This assessment led Ikenberry to a crucial question: “Will the new global order be determined less by the US and more by its legacy partners? Will they seek an alternative framework globally and regionally, or will they make bets to ride this out, and do the transactional politics that Trump is going to request?”
From Ankara to Brussels to Tehran and Moscow, the world reacted with a palpable sense of urgency, seeking answers to variations of Ikenberry’s question. Even before Trump took any action, nations were repositioning, responding, and adjusting to the looming shadow of his presidency. Trump himself seemed somewhat unnerved by the global reaction, admitting in Paris, “The world seems to be going a little crazy now.” Amid this uncertainty, three distinct responses began to emerge.
One group, ideologically aligned with Trump, felt emboldened. This included populists in Europe, Latin America, and Israel who believed their often Russia-friendly nationalism would thrive under an “America First” agenda. The potential consequences included the breakup of the European Union, a drastic deregulation similar to Argentina’s economic policies, a new security architecture with Russia, and even regime change in Tehran.
A second group, led by China, anticipated a diplomatic shake-up with America becoming a destabilizing force, creating opportunities for global realignment. For Beijing, facing potential 50% tariffs, Trump’s willingness to treat allies as adversaries presented a possible leadership vacuum that China, positioning itself as the advocate for “the global majority,” could exploit. This represented one version of the “alternative framework” Ikenberry discussed. Aware of this risk, Trump threatened to impose 100% tariffs on BRICS nations (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, along with Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia, and the UAE) if they attempted to replace the US dollar.
The third group, composed of America’s “legacy partners” in Europe and the G7, adopted a more phlegmatic approach. They hoped to persuade Trump through reason, flattery, and compromise, appealing to his self-interest. Despite their disdain for Trump’s methods, these leaders recognized America’s power and felt compelled to engage with him. As NATO chief Mark Rutte stated in February, “We have to dance with whoever is on the dancefloor.” The challenge became winning Trump over and convincing him that American interests extended beyond its borders. However, as a backup plan, these nations began strengthening alternative frameworks. A European Council on Foreign Relations poll showed widespread European preference for a stronger Europe over a stronger Trump.
This preference is not surprising, given Trump’s characterization of the EU as a “not-so-mini-China” and his tariff threats, which sparked internal European debates on how to respond. Christine Lagarde, president of the European Central Bank, faced criticism for suggesting Europe should appease Trump by purchasing US arms and liquefied natural gas. Pascal Lamy, former WTO director-general, condemned this strategy, arguing for a stronger, unified European response. However, he acknowledged the challenge posed by varying levels of US dependence among European nations.
Trump’s actions regarding Ukraine presented a significant threat to Europe. Without a detailed peace plan, Trump appeared to be threatening both Vladimir Putin and Volodymyr Zelenskyy to force an end to the war, raising serious concerns in Europe. The outgoing head of the EU’s foreign service, Josep Borrell, expressed his deep worry about the potential withdrawal of US support for Ukraine. Trump’s complaint that the US financial contribution to the Ukraine war was disproportionately high compared to Europe added to European anxieties.
In response to the threat of a Trump-Putin deal, Zelenskyy proposed a ceasefire that relied on diplomacy rather than armed conflict to regain lost territory, in exchange for full NATO membership for the remaining part of Ukraine. However, this plan was rejected by Rutte, highlighting the challenges faced by Europe.
Norbert Röttgen, a German CDU foreign affairs specialist, criticized Europe’s failure to invest more heavily in its relationship with the US and build up its own defenses. Borrell acknowledged the need for Europe to act more independently from the US, requiring increased defense spending and a significant shift in mindset. He highlighted the challenges in achieving unity and a strong industrial defense base within the EU. The lack of a unified European position and reliance on external equipment for the Ukraine war illustrated the shortcomings of European capabilities.
Despite these shortcomings, a European plan to protect Ukraine was taking shape, driven by key leaders from Poland, Germany, and France, focusing on a coalition of the willing to provide security guarantees through peacekeeping troops stationed in Ukraine. The sensitivity of this plan prevented public discussion.
Trump’s return also prompted concerns among Middle Eastern leaders about how their region’s conflicts would be affected. Some US diplomats predicted a hands-off approach from Trump, while others, like his national security advisor Mike Waltz, anticipated significant deals. However, diverging opinions on Trump’s approach to the Palestinian issue and the Abraham Accords highlighted the uncertainty.
The Gulf states, like Europe, were seeking to reduce their dependence on the US. Fawaz Gerges, a professor of Middle Eastern studies, pointed to Saudi Arabia’s efforts to diversify its foreign policy, strengthen ties with China, and normalize relations with Iran. He criticized the Biden administration for alienating Arab allies.
Israel, emboldened by its actions in 2024, saw 2025 as an opportunity to reshape the Middle East. The return of Trump brought the prospect of annexation of the West Bank back onto the agenda, alarming the Gulf states. Netanyahu aimed to attack Iran’s nuclear sites, viewing the conditions as favorable. However, Trump’s past statements indicated a potential willingness to negotiate with Iran, depending on the terms. His approach to China also remained uncertain, potentially prioritizing trade over an ideological conflict.
The contrast between Trump’s unpredictable decision-making and China’s more predictable approach was being highlighted globally, potentially overshadowing the complexities of the situation. This narrative was in stark contrast to the bleak assessment offered by incoming Vice President JD Vance, who highlighted the fear of repercussions for defying Trump.